The in is the largest on the African continent. As of 2014, Nigeria's petroleum industry contributes about 14% to its economy. Therefore, though the petroleum sector is important, as government revenues and foreign exchange still heavily rely on this sector, it remains in fact a small part of the country's overall diversified economy. Crude oil from the delta basin comes in two types: light, and comparatively heavy – the lighter around 36 gravity and the heavier, 20–25 gravity. Both types are paraffinic and low in sulfur.

Contents • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • History of oil exploration [ ] The history of oil exploration in Nigeria dates back to 1907 when Nigerian Bitumen Corporation conducted exploratory work in the country; however, the firm left the country at the onset of World War I. Thereafter, licenses were given to and Whitehall Petroleum.

The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Friday urged Russia and China to reconsider their economic ties to the North Korean regime during a heated.

However, neither company found oil of commercial value and they returned their licenses in 1923. A new license covering 920,000 square kilometres (357,000 square miles) was given to a new firm called Shell D'arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. The new firm was a consortium of and (then known as ). The company began exploratory work in 1937.

The consortium was granted license to explore oil all over the territory of Nigeria but in 1951 and then between 1955 and 1957, the acreage allotted to the company in the original license was reduced. Drilling activities started in 1951 and the first test well was drilled in area. Oil was discovered in non-commercial quantities at, near in 1953. Prior to the Akata find, the company had spent around 6 million pounds in exploratory activities in the country. Shell-BP in the pursuit of commercially available petroleum found oil in, Nigeria in 1956. Other important oil wells discovered during the period were Afam and Bomu in territory.

Production of crude oil began in 1957 and in 1960, a total of 847,000 tonnes of crude oil was exported. Towards the end of the 1950s, non-British firms were granted license to explore for oil: in 1955, in 1960, and later in 1961, in 1962, and in 1962.

Prior to the discovery of oil, Nigeria (like many other African countries) strongly relied on agricultural exports to other countries to supply their economy. Many Nigerians thought the developers were looking for. But after nearly 50 years searching for oil in the country, Shell-BP discovered the oil at in the. The first oil field began production in 1958. After that, the economy of Nigeria should have seemingly have experienced a strong increase. However, competition for the profits from oil created a great level of terror and conflict for those living in the region. Many citizens of Nigeria believe that they haven’t been able to see the economic benefits of oil companies in the state.

Additionally, Nigerian government officials have remained majority shareholders in the profits created by the production of Nigerian oil, leading to government capturing of nearly all oil production, and citizens are not seeing socioeconomic benefits, and insist that oil companies should compensate people. Production and exploration [ ]. Satellite image of As of 2000, oil and gas exports accounted for more than 98% of and about 83% of federal government revenue, as well as generating more than 14% of its GDP. It also provides 95% of, and about 65% of government. Nigeria's proven oil reserves are estimated by the (EIA) at between 16 and 22 billion barrels (2.5 ×10 9 and 3.5 ×10 9 m 3), but other sources claim there could be as much as 35.3 billion barrels (5.61 ×10 9 m 3). Its reserves make Nigeria the tenth most petroleum-rich nation, and by the far the most affluent in Africa.

In mid-2001 its crude oil production was averaging around 2,200,000 barrels (350,000 m 3) per day. It is expected that the industry will continue to be profitable based on an average bench mark oil price of $85-$90 per barrel. Nearly all of the country's primary reserves are concentrated in and around the delta of the, but off-shore rigs are also prominent in the well-endowed coastal region. Nigeria is one of the few major oil-producing nations still capable of increasing its oil output. Unlike most of the other OPEC countries, Nigeria is not projected to exceed until at least 2009 [ ]. The reason for Nigeria's relative unproductivity is primarily OPEC regulations on production to regulate prices on the international market. More recently, production has been disrupted intermittently by the protests of the Niger Delta's inhabitants, who feel they are being exploited.

Nigeria has a total of 159 and 1481 in operation according to the. The most productive region of the nation is the coastal in the or 'South-south' region which encompasses 78 of the 159 oil fields. Most of Nigeria's oil fields are small and scattered, and as of 1990, these small unproductive fields accounted for 62.1% of all Nigerian production. This contrasts with the sixteen largest fields which produced 37.9% of Nigeria's petroleum at that time. As a result of the numerous small fields, an extensive and well-developed pipeline network has been engineered to transport the crude oil. Also because of the lack of highly productive fields, money from the jointly operated (with the federal government) companies is constantly directed towards petroleum exploration and production. Nigeria's petroleum is classified mostly as 'light' and 'sweet', as the oil is largely free of.

Nigeria is the largest producer of in OPEC. This sweet oil is similar in composition to petroleum extracted from the. This crude oil is known as 'Bonny light'. Names of other Nigerian crudes, all of which are named according to export terminal, are Qua Ibo, Escravos blend,, Forcados, and Pennington Anfan.

As recently as 2010, Nigeria provided about 10% of overall U.S. Oil imports and ranked as the fifth-largest source for oil imports in the U.S. However, Nigeria ceased exports to the US in July 2014 because of the impact of shale production in America; India is now the largest consumer of Nigerian oil. There are six petroleum exportation terminals in the country. Shell owns two, while Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, and Agip own one each. Shell also owns the Forcados Terminal, which is capable of storing 13 million barrels (2,100,000 m 3) of crude oil in conjunction with the nearby Bonny Terminal. Mobil operates primarily out of the Qua Iboe Terminal in, while Chevron owns the Escravos Terminal located in and has a storage capacity of 3.6 million barrels (570,000 m 3).

Agip operates the Brass Terminal in Brass, a town 113 kilometres (70 miles) southwest of and has a storage capacity of 3,558,000 barrels (565,700 m 3). Texaco operates the Pennington Terminal. Offshore [ ] Oil companies in Africa investigate offshore production as an alternative area of production. Deepwater production mainly involves underwater drilling that exists 400 metres (1,300 ft) or more below the surface of the water. By expanding to deep water drilling the possible sources for finding new oil reserves is expanded. Through the introduction of deep water drilling 50% more oil is extracted than before the new forms of retrieving the oil. And are the largest oil producers in Africa.

In Nigeria, the deepwater sector still has a large avenue to expand and develop. The Agbami oilfields hit full production in 2005, at 250,000 barrels (40,000 m 3) a day. Operated by Chevron's Star Deep and a company called Famfa, Agbami is only one off-shore concession; there are others named Akpo, Bonga and Erha. The amount of oil extracted from Nigeria was expected to expand from 15,000 barrels per day (2,400 m 3/d) in 2003 to 1.27 million barrels per day (202,000 m 3/d) in 2010. Deepwater drilling for oil is especially attractive to oil companies because the has very little share in these activities and it is more difficult for the government to regulate the offshore activities of the companies. The deepwater extraction plants are less disturbed by local militant attacks, seizures due to civil conflicts, and sabotage. These advancements offer more resources and alternatives to extract the oil from the Niger Delta, with less exposure to conflict than the operations on land.

An open-air market for illegal crude oil operates off the Niger Delta, called the. Natural gas [ ] Natural gas reserves are well over 5,300 km 3 (187 × 10 ^ 12 cu ft), the gas reserves are three times as substantial as the crude oil reserves. The biggest natural gas initiative is the, which is operated jointly by several companies and the state. It began exploration and production in 1999. Chevron is also attempting to create the Escravos Gas Utilization project which will be capable of producing 4,500,000 m 3 (160 × 10 ^ 6 cu ft) per day.

Gas reserves. In 2008, the government prepared a Gas Master Plan that was intended to promote natural gas production and encourage the supply of natural gas to domestic power stations so as to help alleviate the country’s electricity shortages. There is also an export gas pipeline, known as the, in the works but has encountered numerous setbacks. The pipeline would allow for transportation of natural gas to, Ghana,, and.

The majority of Nigeria's natural gas is and it is estimated that Nigeria loses 18.2 million US$ daily from the loss of the flared gas. Downstream [ ]. This section's factual accuracy is. Relevant discussion may be found on. Please help to ensure that disputed statements are. (May 2008) () Nigeria's total petroleum refining capacity is 445,000 barrels (70,700 m 3) per day, however, only 240,000 barrels (38,000 m 3) per day was allotted during the 1990s.

Subsequently, crude oil production for refineries was reduced further to as little as 75,000 barrels (11,900 m 3) per day during the regime of. There are four major oil refineries: the Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Plant which can process 125,000 barrels (19,900 m 3) of crude per day, the New Port Harcourt Refinery which can produce 150,000 barrels (24,000 m 3) per day (there is also an 'Old' Port Harcourt Refinery with negligible production), as well as the now defunct Kaduna Refinery. The Port Harcourt and Refineries both operate at only 30% capacity. It is estimated that demand and consumption of petroleum in Nigeria grows at a rate of 12.8% annually.

However, petroleum products are unavailable to most Nigerians and are quite costly, because almost all of the oil extracted by the multinational oil companies is refined overseas, while only a limited quantity is supplied to Nigerians themselves. Current manufacturing [ ] Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer and has been a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries since 1971. The Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, which, accounts for over 95 percent of export earnings and about 40 percent of government revenues, according to the International Monetary Fund. According to the International Energy Agency, Nigeria produced about 2.53 million barrels (402,000 m 3) per day, well below its oil production capacity of over 3 million barrels (480,000 m 3) per day, in 2011. Nigeria is an important oil supplier to the United States. For the last nine years, the United States has imported between 9-11 percent of its crude oil from Nigeria; however, United States import data for the first half of 2012 show that Nigerian crude is down to a 5 percent share of total United States crude imports.

According to the International Energy Agency, in 2011, approximately 33 percent of Nigeria's crude exports were sent to the United States, making Nigeria its fourth largest foreign oil supplier. Although total crude imports into the United States are falling, imports from Nigeria have declined at a steeper rate, according to the International Energy Agency. The main reasons underlying this trend are that some Gulf Coast refiners have reduced Nigerian imports in favor of domestically-produced crude, and that two refineries in the U.S.

East Coast, which were significant buyers of Nigerian crude, were idled in late 2011. As a result, Nigerian crude as a share of total United States imports has fallen to 5 percent in the first half of 2012, down from 10 and 11 percent in the first half of 2011 and 2010, respectively, according to the International Energy Agency.

According to the CIA World Factbook, Nigeria’s main export partners are the United States, India, Brazil, Spain, France and the Netherlands. Shell has been working in Nigeria since 1936, and currently dominates gas production in the country, as the Niger Delta, which contains most of Nigeria's gas resources, also houses most of Shell's hydrocarbon assets. History and politics [ ]. An map of Nigeria. Prior to its official amalgamation into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria by the military forces of the in 1914, the territory of Nigeria was a loose collection of autonomous states, villages, and ethnic communities. Many of these established themselves as pillars of art, trade, and politics in West Africa as late as the 19th century; four of these cultural entities, the, the (sometimes spelled Ibo), the and the grew extremely prominent in the region before the arrival of foreigners, dictated British colonial policies, and dominate national politics in Nigeria to this day. The modern and societies in northern Nigeria are the cultural successors of the, a theocratic state founded by Muslim reformer empire-maker in 1817.

Geographically isolated in the north, the Caliphate was governed by as prescribed by dan Fodio's and maintained greater links commercially and culturally to North Africa and the Arab states than to West Africa and the Atlantic. By contrast, the, the and the in the south had regularly experienced contact with Europeans since at least the 16th century. A minority of southerners converted to Christianity even prior to the establishment of permanent British control, but the majority followed traditional indigenous religions, worshipping myriad deities with vast domains spanning both cosmic and terrestrial spheres. Coastal Nigerians established thriving trade both regionally and abroad, fashioning the coast into a hub for products like palm oil, a good sought after by rapidly industrialising Europe, while also serving as key source for the prior to its international banning (the region came to be known as the as a result). The Niger Delta region, which is roughly synonymous with the in location and the contemporary heart of the petroleum industry, is and was a zone of dense cultural diversity and is currently inhabited by roughly forty ethnic groups speaking an estimated 250 dialects. Some of the more relevant ethnic groups in the western part of the Niger Delta region include the,, and. The Ijaw (sometimes spelled Ijo), the fourth most populous tribe in Nigeria and by far the largest in the Delta region, lived during late medieval times in small fishing villages within the inlets of the delta; however by the 16th century, as the slave trade grew in importance, Ijaw port cities like and developed into major trading states which served as major exporters of fish and other goods regionally.

Other states such as those of domain of sprang up at this time as well. The eastern Niger Delta region has the people ( / / who are all related with a common language and ancestors who were all referred to as or people in early Nigerian history). Their capital city of, located at the coastal southeast of Nigeria (eastern Niger Delta) served as the major trading and shipping center during the pre-colonial and colonial period. Calabar also served as the first capital of Nigeria and the point of entry of Western religion and Western education into southeastern Nigeria. The combined population of the, and people is the fourth largest language group in Nigeria. Colonial legacy (1800s–1960s) [ ].

See also: and secessionism arose in part from the pogroms in the North that were aimed at Eastern people, most specifically, the Igbo. However, since the southeast encompassed most of the petroleum-rich, the prospect emerged of the Eastern Region gaining self-sufficiency and increasing prosperity.

The exclusion of easterners from power caused many in the east to fear that oil revenues would be used to benefit areas in the north and west rather than their own. The desire to accrue profits from oil revenues combined with ethnic tensions acted as a catalyst for the Igbo-spearheaded secession. Additionally, despite his denials in later years, it appears that Ojukwu's insistence on secession at the time was heavily influenced by his knowledge of the extent of the area's oil reserves.

[ ] Recent evidence has suggested a tax battle waged by American oil companies contributed to the regional and ethnic tensions that would lead to the outbreak of war. It was also during this period that, again thanks to the Americans, the opacity and concomitant corruption of Nigerian oil began to crystallise. However, evidence from leaked US State Department documents have proven that Britain, through, still held the most influence over the Nigerian oil industry at the time the war broke out. The United States declared neutrality, with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that 'America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area under British influence,' but nevertheless provided military assistance to the Nigeria government.

On top of scores of deaths, the war had a largely negative impact on the oil industry. Strife caused production of crude to drop significantly, particularly in Biafra. Total crude output decreased from 420,000 barrels per day (67,000 cubic metres per day) in 1966 at the start of the war, to only 140,000 barrels per day (22,000 cubic metres per day) in 1968. Shell alone saw a drop from 367,000 barrels per day (58,300 cubic metres per day) in 1966, to 43,000 (6,800) in 1968.

And in addition to concerns about production, oil companies began experiencing uncertainty as to the future of their investments depending on who prevailed in the war. This led to relations between oil companies and the federal government becoming strained, with the government at one point accusing the oil company Safrap (now, but until 1974) of favouring Biafra and enlisting the aid of France for the Biafran cause. Shell, the other major holder of concessions in the southeast, was concerned but placated and limited politically by Britain's staunch support of the Nigerian government in the war effort.

[ ] Despite oil's prominent role in national affairs, up to this time, the Nigerian federal government had only limited involvement in the, and the government confined its financial involvement in the oil industry to taxes and on the oil companies. The companies were subsequently able to set their own price on the petroleum they extracted, and dominated petroleum to such a point that laws governing the oil sector were having a negative effect on Nigerian interests. However, even during the conflict with Biafra would force changes to the relationship between federal government and the petroleum industry.

Gowon's military government instituted the 1969 Petroleum Decree which dismantled the existing revenue allocation system that had divided revenue from oil taxes equally between federal and state government, instead favouring an allocation formula in which the federal government controlled the dispensation of revenues to the states. [ ] After the loss of over 2,000,000 lives, the war concluded in 1970 and resulted in a victory for the Nigerian state, as the secessionist regions were subsequently brought back into the Nigerian fold. However, the former Eastern Region had been split into two new states, and South-Eastern (now Cross River) in order to discourage lingering ideas of independence. [ ] Industry nationalisation (1970–1979) [ ]. See also: In May 1971 the Nigerian federal government, then under the control of General, nationalised the oil industry by creating the via a decree. Following the war with, the government felt it necessary to secure and gain more control over the oil industry.

Of the oil sector was also precipitated by Nigeria's desire to join, which was encouraging member states to acquire 51% stakes and become increasingly involved in the oil sector. Although the Nigerian government had maintained involvement in the industry prior to 1971, this was accomplished mainly through business deals on concessions of the foreign firms in operation. The creation of the NNOC made government participation in the industry legally binding. The federal government would continue to consolidate its oil involvement throughout the next several decades. However, it was during the years of Gowon and his successors and known officially as the, who ruled amidst the of the 1970s that the of petroleum in Nigeria truly became characterised by endemic and corruption by the, which plagues the nation to this day. At both state and federal government levels, power and therefore wealth has typically been monopolised by select who maintain a strong tendency to 'look after their own' by financially rewarding their political supporters. At the state or community level this means that interest groups in power will reward and protect their own; this is typically based on ethnic/tribal or religious affiliation of the interest group.

The heavy patronage based on tribal affiliation has fueled ethnic unrest and violence throughout Nigeria, but particularly in the states, where the stakes for control of the immense are very high. At the federal level, political elites have utilised patronage to consolidate power for the ruling government, not only by rewarding their political friends in the federal government, but also by paying off major interest groups at the state or tribal level in order to elicit their cooperation. Inevitably these financial favours are distributed unequally and inefficiently, resulting in concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small minority. Nigeria is ranked by the 136st out of 180 countries total (for comparison, this is the same as Russia). Following the NNOC's genesis, the Nigerian government continued to garner control over oil revenues.

In 1972 it declared that all property not currently owned by a foreign entity was legally the property of the government, which gained jurisdiction over the sale and allocation of concessions to foreign investors. The military regime oversaw the implementation of a number of other important milestones related to oil: 1974: Participation in oil industry by government increases to 55%.

1975: Decree 6 increases federal government share in oil sector to 80%, with only 20% going to the states. 1976: First exploration and development venture by NNOC undertaken and drills to uncover commercial quantities of petroleum off-shore. 1978: Perhaps most importantly, the federal government created the which vested control over state lands in military governors appointed by the federal military regime, and eventually led to Section 40(3) of the 1979 constitution which declared all minerals, oil, natural gas, and natural resources found within the bounds of Nigeria to be legal property of the Nigerian federal government. 1979: In an effort to establish further control over the industry, the government merges and restructures the NNOC and the Ministry of Petroleum to form the, an entity which would exert more power over the allocation and sale of concessions than the NNOC. By 1979, the NNPC had also gained 60% participation in the oil industry. Attempted democracy and debt (1979–1983) [ ] Despite the vast revenues accrued by Gowon and his heirs, the junta succumbed to the demands of the civilian population, and in 1979 military head of state handed over power to elected (NPN) candidate. This event coincided with the declaration of Nigeria's Second Republic.

At this juncture, the oil producing states of the Niger Delta were accounting for 82% of all federal government revenue but the population of these areas received very little compensation and demands for adequate reimbursement for the black gold extracted from their land could be heard at this time. Overall, petroleum accounted for 96% of all government external revenue but a mere 27% of the nation's GDP.

However, the advent of democracy did not improve the situation. A 1982 Revenue Act implemented by the Shagari government would eventually be modified by yet another military regime in 1984 via which reduced the government share of oil revenue from 80% to 55%. States got 32.5% and 10% went to local governments. The remaining 1.5% was earmarked as a special fund to new develop oil-producing areas, but during the Shagari regime the corruption in Nigerian governance reached its zenith and out of Nigeria peaked, while people in the oil-producing areas continued to receive little or none of the oil profits. Additionally, 1980 saw oil-generated revenues attain an all-time high of US $24.9 billion but Nigeria still managed an international debt of $9 billion. Shagari's NPN government was viewed by the majority of Nigerians as incorrigibly corrupt by the time the national elections of 1983 came about.

Shagari and his subordinates steadily transformed Nigeria into a where Nigerian military and police forces were permitted to utilise force quite liberally in order to control the civilian population. Such repressive measures were employed to ensure victory in the forthcoming elections, and this outcome was achieved largely through the bankrupting of the federal government's treasury. Another disturbing trend had also been gaining steam in Nigeria since the early 1970s: a steep drop in correlating roughly with the rise in federal revenues from petroleum extraction. Whereas previously Nigeria had been the world's lead exporter of, production of this dropped by 43%, while productivity in other important income generators like rubber (29%), (64%), and cotton (65%) plummeted as well between 1972 and 1983. The decline in agricultural production was not limited to cash crops amid the oil boom, and national output of staple foodstuffs also fell.

This situation contrasts to Nigeria in 1960 just after independence, when despite British underdevelopment, the nation was more or less self-sufficient in terms of food supply, while crops made up 97% of all revenue from exports. The drop in production was so substantial that by the early 1980s the NPN government was forced to implement a now notorious import license scheme which essentially involved Nigeria, for the first time in its history, importing basic food items. However, as Nigerian activist and asserts, 'the import license scam that was used by the party as a reward and enticement for party loyalists and would-be supporters cost the nation billions of dollars.while food production in the country virtually ceased'. Return to military rule and electoral annulment (1983–1993) [ ] For these reasons, seizure of power by General a short time after the NPN government was fraudulently re-elected was initially perceived as a positive development by civilians. Buhari charged out of the gate in December 1983, declaring himself, he condemned the civilian government's blatant corruption and instituted programs supposedly designed to eliminate the disease of corruption. However, these measures were largely transparent and the looting of federal coffers by Nigeria's rulers continued largely unabated, 'as Shagari's officers – both within party and government – left the country, came in and out as they pleased, while Burahi's tribunal sentence opposition figures to spells of between a hundred and three hundred years in prison for every dubious kind of crime'. The Buhari government neglected to punish even Shagari himself, a consistent trend in Nigerian's long line of dictariorial rulers, who almost universally been spared any kind of justice.

In 1985, another general, this time General, stole power and again alleged that his predecessors were corrupt violators of human rights and promised to rectify the situation, committing to a return to democracy by 1990. Nigeria had been saddled with a crushingly large international debt at this point. This was because, despite over 101 billion having been generated by the oil industry between 1958 and 1983, nearly all of these funds had been siphoned into the private bank accounts and the state sponsored pet projects maintained by the succession of Nigerian governmental elites. Immediately prior to Babangida's rise to power, which is viewed by some [ ] as having been orchestrated by international oil and banking interests [ – ], the was exerting increasingly acute pressure on the Nigerian government to repay its massive debts, of which 44% of all federal revenue was already servicing. Therefore, it was unsurprising when Babangida implemented the IMF's in October 1986 in order to facilitate debt repayment. The SAP was extremely controversial while it was in effect between 1986 and 1988.

While it did permit Nigerian exports to become more competitive internationally and spurred a degree of economic growth, the SAP also incurred a dramatic drop in real wages for the majority of Nigerians. This, combined with major cuts to important public services, incited public unrest so extreme that Babangida's was obliged to partially reverse the SAP initiatives and return to inflationary economic policies. Babangida's rule also oversaw the annihilation of the Nigerian economic middle class, and Nigeria's entry to the, despite Muslims accounting for less than 50% of the Nigerian populace. The 1980s military juntas conducted several attempted re-organisations of the to increase its efficiency.

However, according to most sources by the early 1990s the NNPC was characterised by chronic inefficiency and waste. Red tape and poor organisation are standard, with the NNPC being divided into several sub-entities, each fulfilling a particular function. This is despite the NNPC's growing participation in the industry, including development and exploration of numerous off-shore wells.

As a result, the functionality of the industry is dependent on foreign corporations, not the NNPC. The sudden jump in oil prices caused by the in 1990 and 1991, as most researchers confirm, was at best squandered. The Babangida junta has been widely accused of 'mismanaging' the oil windfall from the Gulf War price jump, which accounted for about $12.5 billion in revenues. Another alleges that the federal government siphoned off about $12.2 billion between 1988 and 1994 into private accounts or expenditures, 'clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt'.

Under these circumstances, Babangida eventually allowed for nationwide elections on 12 June 1993. These elections were declared universally free and fair (at least in comparison to past elections) by all major international election monitors, and the eventual winner of the presidential race was the Chief M.K.O. Abiola [of the newly formed SDP]. However, the military regime cynically pronounced the election, in which fourteen million Nigerians participated, to be null and void due to '. The Nigerian people took to the streets in large numbers to protest the election's annulment. As civil unrest continued, Babangida was forced to cede power to the caretaker government of. An environment of crisis (1993–present) [ ] Shonekan's interim government would be short-lived, as on 17 November 1993, Babangida's former Chief of Army Staff and overthrew the caretaker regime and installed himself as Head of State.

Popular opposition to the junta was widespread and public demonstrations were taking place on a regular basis. Immediately upon taking power, Abacha commenced the brutal repression of these subversive elements which would make his tenure notorious on a global basis. Throughout the early 1990s such popular unrest grew steadily, particularly in the Niger Delta region, where various ethnic groups began demanding compensation for years of ecological damage as well as control over their land's oil resources. This unrest manifested itself at the outset as peaceful activist organisations that united their members on the basis of ethnicity.

One of the most prominent of these organisations to emerge in the region was the ( MOSOP). The group declared that the, a small minority in Rivers state of Nigeria, were slowly being annihilated as the arable terrain of their homeland (known as Ogoniland) was degraded by pollution from oil production by and primarily. Main article: Conflict in the arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the, the Nigerian federal government, and a number of the Niger Delta's ethnic groups who felt they were being exploited, particularly minority groups like the as well as the in the late 1990s. Ethnic and political unrest has continued throughout the 1990s and persists as of 2006 despite the conversion to a more democratic, civilian federal system under the government in 1999; democracy has to some degree fan the flames as politicians seeking office may now employ militia groups to coerce voters and generally disrupt the election process. Competition for oil wealth has fuelled violence between innumerable, causing the militarisation of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups as well as and police forces (notably the ).

Victims of crimes are fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of growing 'impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses, [which] has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence'. The regional and ethnic conflicts are so numerous that fully detailing each is impossible and impractical. On 30 January 2013, a Dutch court ruled that Shell can be held accountable for the pollution in the Niger Delta. Joint venture companies [ ] All petroleum production and exploration is taken under the auspices of joint ventures between foreign multi-national corporations and the Nigerian federal government. This joint venture manifests itself as the, a nationalised state corporation.

All companies operating in Nigeria obey government operational rules and naming conventions (companies operating in Nigeria must legally be sub-entities of the main corporation, often incorporating 'Nigeria' into its name). Joint ventures account for approximately 95% of all crude oil output, while local independent companies operating in marginal fields account for the remaining 5%. Additionally, the Nigerian constitution states that all, oil, and gas legally belong to the federal government. Six companies are operating in Nigeria and are listed with their countries of origin (most of the following is extracted from a 1999 report ): (British/Dutch) Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), usually known simply as: A joint venture operated by accounts for 50% of Nigerian's total oil production (899,000 barrels (142,900 m 3) per day in 1997) from more than eighty oil fields.

The joint venture is composed of NNPC (55%), (30%), (10%) and (5%) and operates largely onshore on dry land or in the in the. 'The company has more than 100 producing oil fields, and a network of more than 6,000 kilometres of pipelines, flowing through 87 flowstations.

SPDC operates 2 coastal oil export terminals'. The Shell joint venture produces about 50% of Nigeria's total crude. Shell Nigeria owns concessions on four companies, they are: (SPDC), Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO), Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG), Shell Nigeria Oil Products (SNOP), as well as holding a major stake in Nigeria Liquified Natural Gas (NLNG). Shell formerly operated alongside as Shell-BP, but BP has since sold all of its Nigerian concessions. Most of Shell's operations in Nigeria are conducted through the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). (American) Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL): A joint venture between NNPC (60%) and Chevron (40%) has in the past been the second largest producer (approximately 400,000 barrels per day (64,000 cubic metres per day)), with fields located in the Warri region west of the Niger river and offshore in shallow water. It is reported to aim to increase production to 600,000 barrels per day (95,000 cubic metres per day).

(American) Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPNU): A joint venture between the NNPC (60%) and Exxon-Mobil (40%) operates in shallow water off Akwa Ibom state in the southeastern delta and averaged production of 632,000 barrels per day (100,500 cubic metres per day) in 1997, making it the second largest producer, as against 543,000 barrels per day (86,300 cubic metres per day) in 1996. Mobil also holds a 50% interest in a Production Sharing Contract for a deep water block further offshore, and is reported to plan to increase output to 900,000 barrels per day (140,000 cubic metres per day) by 2000. Oil industry sources indicate that Mobil is likely to overtake Shell as the largest producer in Nigeria within the next five years, if current trends continue, mainly due to its offshore base allowing it refuge from the strife Shell has experienced onshore. It is headquartered in and operates in Nigeria under the subsidiary of Mobil Producing Nigeria (MPN).

(Italian) Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC): A joint venture operated by Agip and owned by the NNPC (60%), Agip (20%) and (20%) produces 150,000 barrels per day (24,000 cubic metres per day) mostly from small onshore fields. (French) Total Petroleum Nigeria Limited (TPNL): A joint venture between NNPC (60%) and (now ) produced approximately 125,000 barrels per day (19,900 cubic metres per day) during 1997, both on and offshore. Elf and Mobil are in dispute over operational control of an offshore field with a production capacity of 90,000 barrels per day (14,000 cubic metres per day). (now merged with Chevron) NNPC Texaco-Chevron Joint Venture (formerly Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria Unlimited): A joint venture operated by Texaco and owned by NNPC (60%), Texaco (20%) and Chevron (20%) currently produces about 60,000 barrels per day (9,500 cubic metres per day) from five offshore fields.

Current situation [ ] Nigeria’s oil revenue has totaled $340 billion in exports since the 1970s and it is the fifth largest producer. Though Nigeria is a major oil exporter, it imports most of its gasoline, and when fuel subsidies were lifted in January 2012, fuel increased from roughly $1.70 per gallon to $3.50. Nigeria produces a form of oil ideal for the United States, has huge reserves, and has increased its production to 2.8 million barrels (450,000 m 3) of oil a day. But this, some say, is all a that is hurting Nigeria and disadvantaging her people. Oil theft [ ] A report analysing the effect of oil theft in Nigeria revealed in July 2013 that Nigeria lost $10.9 billion in potential oil revenues between 2009 and 2011. Environmental impact [ ]. Map of vegetation in Nigeria The Niger Delta comprises 70,000 square kilometres (27,000 square miles) of formed primarily by deposition.

Home to more than 20 million people and 40 different ethnic groups, this makes up 7.5% of Nigeria's total land mass. It is the largest and maintains the third-largest drainage area in Africa. The Delta's environment can be broken down into four ecological zones:,, freshwater, and lowland. This incredibly well-endowed, which contains one of the highest concentrations of on the planet, in addition to supporting an abundant and, arable terrain that can sustain a wide variety of crops,, and more species of than any ecosystem in West Africa. The region could experience a loss of 40% of its inhabitable terrain in the next thirty years because of extensive dam construction in the region. The carelessness of the oil industry has also precipitated this situation, which can perhaps be best encapsulated by a report issued by the in 1983, long before popular unrest surfaced: We witnessed the slow poisoning of the waters of this country and the destruction of vegetation and agricultural land by oil spills which occur during petroleum operations. But since the inception of the oil industry in Nigeria, more than twenty-five years ago, there has been no concerned and effective effort on the part of the government, let alone the oil operators, to control environmental problems associated with the industry.

Oil spills and water contamination [ ] are a common occurrence; it has been estimated that between 9 and 13 million barrels (1,400,000 and 2,100,000 m 3) have been spilled since oil drilling started in 1958. The government estimates that about 7,000 spills occurred between 1970 and 2000. Causes include corrosion of and tankers (accounts for 50% of all spills), sabotage (28%), and oil production operations (21%), with 1% of the spills being accounted for by inadequate or non-functional production equipment. One reason that accounts for such a high percentage of all spills is that as a result of the small size of the oilfields in the, there is an extensive network of pipelines between the fields. Many facilities and pipelines were constructed to older standards, are poorly maintained and have outlived their estimated life span.

Sabotage is performed primarily through what is known as 'bunkering', whereby the saboteur taps a pipeline, and in the process of extraction sometimes the pipeline is damaged. Oil extracted in this manner is often sold for cash compensation.

Oil spills have a major impact on the ecosystem. Large tracts of have been desroyed. They are especially susceptible to oil spills because the oil is stored in the and re-released annually with each inundation. An estimated 5–10% of Nigerian mangrove ecosystems have been wiped out either by settlement or by oil. Spills also take out crops and through contamination of and soils.

Is frequently contaminated, and a sheen of oil is visible in many localised bodies of water. If the drinking water is contaminated, even if no immediate health effects are apparent, the numerous and other chemicals present in oil represent a risk.

Offshore spills, which are usually much greater in scale, contaminate coastal environments and cause a decline in local fishing production. Nigerian regulations are weak and rarely enforced allowing oil companies, in essence, to self-regulate. Natural gas flaring [ ] See also main article: Nigeria flares more natural gas associated with oil extraction than any other country, with estimates suggesting that of the 99,000,000 m 3 (3.5 × 10 ^ 9 cu ft) of associated gas (AG) produced annually, 71,000,000 m 3 (2.5 × 10 ^ 9 cu ft), or about 70% is wasted via flaring. Statistical data associated with is notoriously unreliable, but AG wasted during flaring is estimated to cost Nigeria US $2.5 billion on a yearly basis.

Companies operating in Nigeria harvest natural gas for commercial purposes, however prefer to extract it gas from deposits where it is found in isolation as non-associated gas. It is costly to separate commercially viable associated gas from oil, hence gas flaring to increase crude production. Gas flaring is discouraged by the international community as it contributes to. In fact, in western Europe 99% of associated gas is used or re-injected into the ground. Gas flaring in Nigeria releases large amounts, which has very high potential. The methane is accompanied by, of which Nigeria is estimated to have emitted more than 34.38 million tons in 2002, accounting for about 50% of all industrial emissions in the country and 30% of the total CO 2 emissions. As flaring in the west has been minimised, in Nigeria it has grown proportionally with oil production.

While the international community, the Nigerian government, and the oil corporations seem to agree that gas flaring need to be curtailed, efforts to do so have been slow and largely ineffective. Gas flares release a variety of potentially poisonous chemicals such as,, like,, and, as well as carcinogens like and.

Often gas flares are often close to local communities, and lack adequate fencing or protection for villagers who may risk nearing the heat of the flare in order to carry out their daily activities. Flares which are often older and inefficient are rarely relocated away from villages, and are known to coat the land and communities in the area with and damage adjacent vegetation. In November 2005 a judgment by, 'the Federal High Court of Nigeria ordered that gas flaring must stop in a Niger Delta community as it violates guaranteed constitutional rights to life and dignity. In a case brought against the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (Shell), Justice C. Nwokorie ruled in Benin City that the damaging and wasteful practice of flaring cannot lawfully continue.'

Human rights impact [ ] Repression of protest and government corruption [ ] One of the greatest threats facing the people of the Niger River Delta has actually been their own government. The Nigerian government has total control over property rights and they have the authority to seize any property for use by the oil companies. A majority of every dollar that comes out of the ground in the delta goes to the State and Federal governments. According to the, most of Nigeria’s oil wealth gets siphoned off by 1% of the population.

Corruption in the government is rampant, in fact since 1960 it is estimated that 300 to 400 billion dollars has been stolen by corrupt government officials. The corruption is found at the highest levels as well. For example, a former inspector general of the national police was accused of stealing 52 million dollars. He was sentenced to six years in prison for a lesser charge.

Nigerians have on many occasions engaged in protests against oil-related corruption and environmental concerns in the past, but have been met with harsh suppression by government forces. For example, in February 2005 at a protest at Chevron's Escravos oil terminal, soldiers opened fire on the protestors. One man was killed and 30 others were injured. The soldiers claimed that the protestors were armed, which the protestors denied. Another, more extreme example happened in 1994. The Nigerian military moved into a region called in force.

They razed 30 villages, arrested hundreds of protestors, and killed an estimated 2,000 people. One of the protestors they arrested was a man named, a Nigerian TV producer, writer and social activist.

In 1990 he founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Ken wrote and spoke out about the rampant corruption in the Nigerian government and he condemned and. He was arrested by the Nigerian government and imprisoned for 17 months.

Then in a show trial he and eight others were condemned to death. He and the others were hung in 1995 and he was buried in an unmarked common grave.

Poverty and chronic underdevelopment [ ] Previous pipeline explosions in Nigeria City Date Casualties 26 December 2007 at least 40 at least 260 at least 150 December 2004 at least 20 September 2004 at least 60 June 2003 at least 105 July 2000 at least 300 March 2000 at least 50 at least 1000 The people of the delta states live in extreme poverty even in the face of great material wealth found in the waters by their homes. According to in 2006, 70% of the people in the Niger River Delta live on less than US$1 per day. For many people, this means finding work in a labour market which is in many instances hostile to them.

Much of the labour in the past has been imported. To a growing degree, the labour force for the oil companies is coming from Nigeria. But discrimination is rampant, and for the most part, locals are discriminated against. This leads to a situation where the men in the community have to search for temporary employment. This has two negative effects on the community.

First it takes the men out of the community as they go in search of work. The second is the nature of temporary employment sets up unsustainable spending habits ). They earn some money and spend it thinking it will be easy to earn more, when in many cases this does not turn out to be the case. As the government officials siphon off all the money generated from oil sales the infrastructure suffers.

Most of the villages do not have electricity or even running water. They do not have good access to schools or medical clinics. For many, even clean drinking water is difficult to come. The deterioration of the infrastructure in the delta states is so severe it is even a problem in the more urban areas. One example of this is the airport at Port Harcourt. Part of a fence was not properly maintained and an Air France flight hit a herd of cattle on the runway in 2005.

The airport was closed and still had not reopened by 2007. The leadership of the Niger Delta region appears responsible for most of the underdevelopment in the region. There is large-scale corruption amongst the elected leaders especially governors, and the leaders have helped sponsor the militant groups kidnapping innocent people and sabotaging efforts by the federal government for infrastructure development. Indicted corrupt leaders are also cheered by the Niger Delta people. References [ ].

Many more foreign hostages than originally reported were taken by the Al Qaeda terrorists at the Amenas gas plant in Algeria. The Algerian government says that 100 out of 132 were freed, and some sources say that 30 or more hostages were killed. The British government offered the Algerians manpower, equipment, and expert assistance to expedite the resolution of the crisis, but was refused. American, British, and French nationals are thought to be among the dead.

In other news, the latest figures from Angola indicate that at least 250,000 Chinese nationals have migrated to the country. The Angolan government says that work permits were issued for the Chinese to assist with development projects. To see the headlines and the articles, open.

Thanks to Andy Bostom, C. Cantoni, DS, EG, Insubria, JD,, Mary Abdelmassih,,,, and all the other tipsters who sent these in. Notice to tipsters: Please don’t submit extensive excerpts from articles that have been posted behind a subscription firewall, or are otherwise under copyright protection. Commenters are advised to leave their comments at this post (rather than with the news articles) so that they are more easily accessible.

Caveat: Articles in the news feed are posted “as is”. Gates of Vienna cannot vouch for the authenticity or accuracy of the contents of any individual item posted here. We check each entry to make sure it is relatively interesting, not patently offensive, and at least superficially plausible. The link to the original is included with each item’s title. Further research and verification are left to the reader. Note: Takuan’s post (which was originally published last night) is to remain at the top for a while, so I made it “sticky”.

However, much has happened since it went up, including the Blogger outage. Scroll down for a. See also: Two forthrightly, in Germany, and of the Imran Firasat interview. More new posts will be added below this one.

Oh, and don’t mess around with. The essay below is the conclusion of the ninth part in a series by Takuan Seiyo.

See the list at the bottom of this post for links to the previous installments. Left: Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Dance at Le Moulin de la Galette, 1876 Right: George Grosz, Metropolis, 1916/17 The Bee and the Lamb Part 9 (continued) By Takuan Seiyo A Whole New Road to Serfdom That Which is Not Seen (continued) For over 60 years, White mea-culpists have had a firm grip in all fields of cultural mind imprinting: education high and low; paper media, then electronic, then digital media; all forms of entertainment, the plastic arts and music high and low, and religious instruction and worship too. Their main endeavor has been to enforce their compulsory (e.g. K-12) and discretionary (e.g. Television) self-flaying on account of long-ago Slavery, Colonialism, Imperialism, Male Supremacism, Racism, Antisemitism, and so on. It’s the evils of the Iberian Inquisition — which were evil — but not the evils of the Japanese equivalent in which, in the 40 years up to 1597, 50,000 Christians were publicly crucified, burned or beheaded. Nor the evils of the worldwide Islamic Inquisition which — not in the 16th century but now, in the 21st, condemns Muslim apostates to barbaric execution.

It’s America’s destruction of the snail darter but not Mussulmanism’s destruction of the Bamyan Buddhas or its proposed destruction of the, let alone its obliteration of all the pre-Rome cradles of Christianity but for remaining ruins in the Middle East and dust of the desert in North Africa. It’s the evils of feudalism and industrial workers’ exploitation in Europe and America, but not the strict Confucian evils of Northeast Asia. There, a member of the ruling class in China had, essentially, a free hand with anyone of the lower classes, a Japanese samurai could test his sword by cutting down an insolent peasant, and farmers were so squeezed by their fief holders that they habitually sold their daughters to bordellos for the few coins it provided for next season’s seed. Feminism, Socialism and anti-Antisemitism should have arisen in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, Algeria or Peshawar, for good reasons. Instead, aggressive White androphobes of all genders which I can no longer count are decimating the philogynous and egalitarian West. Equality psychos are tearing down the most egalitarian society that ever existed (except for initial communist experiments, before they turned bloody).

American Jews, at the apex of the greatest fortune and philosemitic tolerance their long diaspora has ever bestowed on their kind, are busy supporting all the ideologies and policies that demolish their safe harbor and build up their Muslim, Black and Third World enemies. They will come to rue their tacit assumption that better the antisemite you don’t know than the few hundred imputed and real ones catalogued at ADL. One would be hard put to find a nation not based on the invasion of another people’s territory and their mass slaughter. Yet poisoned American madmen proclaim as though the Indians themselves did not fight endless genocidal wars from Peru to Canada, with torture, ritual murder or slavery for the captives and, at times, cannibalism too. Leftoid masochists and the Christian meek call for returning Hawaii to the Hawaiians and capitulating before a massive Mexican reconquista of one-third of America. The self-defined “Feminist-Tauist-NeoPagan-Post-Structuralist-Deconstructionist-Socialist” useful idiot Gillian Schutte begins her New Year 2013 by “wholeheartedly apologizing for what my ancestors did to the people of South Africa and inviting you to do the same.” Yet the Magyars don’t seem to feel much guilt over the Illyrians, Pannonians, Sarmatians and Celts whose land and lives they took in the 9th century, to form Hungary. The rightful Etruscan landowners are not bearing angry placards in front of the Vatican.

The Japanese are not planning to relinquish Hokkaido to its original owners, the Ainu. The tall, white and fair-haired Chachapoyas of the Andean forest have, alas, no remnants left to sue the Incas for genocide in a Peruvian court of law. The Aztecs, whether in Jalisco or Los Angeles, don’t agonize over having taken what would become Mexico City from its original Culhuacan owners, with lots of grisly details. Yet for 38 years Neil Young has been reminding adoring audiences about “”, discreetly omitting and the killer people whom Cortez killed. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996) is a book by Daniel Goldhagen presenting the thesis that the German nation as such was composed of willing executioners of the Jews because of a unique “eliminationist antisemitism” in the German people, with long historical roots. However, even that great moral abyss of Western civilization — the Holocausts — stands out more in its industrialized and organizational features than it does either in the quality of its hatefulness or its relative or even absolute volumes.

And Holocausts they were, for in addition to the nearly 6 million Jews, the Germans also murdered over 21 million civilian Slavs, and that’s counting Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Czechoslovakia alone. In absolute numbers, the total number of World War II non-German civilian victims of Nazi Germany is smaller than the 50 million victims of the Bolsheviks in Russia, or Mao’s 70 million in China, or the Mughal-Muslim genocide of Hindus — the latter have their own Holocaust Day on August 14. Rpg Maker Vx Ace Modern Tilesets Free Download here. In relative numbers, in just one year, 1994, the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, killed off a total of one million, in a population of 7 million.

75% of the Tutsi population was erased. Is it more humane to go by a stroke of a blunt machete than by a whiff of Zyklon B? The Khmer Rouge murdered at least 2 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979: one quarter of the population, by a conservative count. Is it more humane to die by wallops from a Cambodian pickaxe handle than by a bullet from a German Mauser? Inscription on the back (in German): “Ukraine 1942, Jewish Aktion, Ivangorod.” There is a special horror attached to the Third Reich, because those were 20 th century Europeans, Christians, and in many ways the smartest, most civilized people on Earth. But the Holocausts do not prove that Whites are worse than other people, just that they are no better.

The history of the Third Reich also proves that with the right formula of economic blowup, misery and humiliation, sparked by charismatic evil, no people are immune to such horror, at no time. A big tip of the Bodissey pickelhaube to our commenter Jolie Rouge, who with a brand new acronym. The occasion was an observation about (the link only works in the UK): Andrew Neil and Michael Portillo are joined by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and Alastair Campbell. Interesting conversation — acknowledging the geopolitical threat to the West. Note the aggressor is not named other than by geographical location (e.g.) North Africa, Afghanistan and surprisingly the inclusion of Turkey.

Amazingly they manage to avoid the JIM words — Jihad, Islam and Muslim. I think JIM could have great utility for our enterprise: it’s concise, pronounceable, handy to use, and easy to propagate. Who will be the first major Western politician (not counting Geert Wilders) to break the greatest cultural taboo of our time, and mess around with JIM?

Tonight’s news feed is unusually fat, due to the inclusion of last night’s items, which were never used because of the Blogger outage. Yesterday a group of Al Qaeda terrorists assaulted a natural gas plant in Algeria and killed two foreigners while taking 41 other hostage.

Today Algerian special forces staged a helicopter raid on the plant, killing a number of the hostages — between six and 34, depending on whose figures you believe — in the process of taking out the terrorists. Among the foreign hostages were American, British, French, and Japanese nationals.

In other news, Germany has begun repatriating its foreign gold reserves, which are stored in vaults in Paris, London, and the United States. To see the headlines and the articles, open. Cantoni, Erick Stakelbeck, Fjordman, Insubria, JB, JD,,, McR,,, and all the other tipsters who sent these in. Notice to tipsters: Please don’t submit extensive excerpts from articles that have been posted behind a subscription firewall, or are otherwise under copyright protection.

+ Commenters are advised to leave their comments at this post (rather than with the news articles) so that they are more easily accessible. Caveat: Articles in the news feed are posted “as is”. Gates of Vienna cannot vouch for the authenticity or accuracy of the contents of any individual item posted here. We check each entry to make sure it is relatively interesting, not patently offensive, and at least superficially plausible. The link to the original is included with each item’s title. Further research and verification are left to the reader.

Is a Pakistani ex-Muslim who collaborated with Terry Jones on the movie The Innocent Prophet (watch it ). The Spanish government recently revoked his status as a political refugee in Spain, and he is due to be deported to Pakistan, where he will face the death penalty for blasphemy.

There is currently a to grant him and his family political asylum. Firasat was interviewed recently on Alerta Digital TV. The video below shows the third part of the interview, and includes segments in English of a statement by Terry Jones. Many thanks to our Spanish correspondent Hermes for the translation, and to for the subtitling: Transcript. Uma Noite Magica Download Dublado. We are in the midst of a Winter Weather Warning (also known as Crystallized Climate Change) here at Schloss Bodissey. That means I am watching big, fat flakes accumulating on everything — though the driveway is still clear.

Prior to that, we awoke this morning to heavy rains. It is our good fortune that there was never any period of transitional ice. Thank heavens!

Why am I talking about the weather, you ask? Because this heavy wet snow may well eventuate in a power outage. Should that happen we would have no way to tell you why when, once again, no one seems to be home. If the power does go out, I’m confident it won’t be for long.

Our rural electric cooperative is exceptionally good at handling these kinds of weather ‘events’; if we do go out, it won’t be for long. And thanks to the generosity of our donors several years ago, we installed a gas cook stove so we can cook and have — thank heavens, again — hot coffee during the outage. Yes, we are careful regarding the possibility of carbon monoxide poisoning if we were to use the stove for heat.

However, given how leaky our storm windows are, I’m not worried. Here’s what NOAA says. Yesterday we reported on a group of young Muslim men who accost pedestrians in certain parts of east London. They insist that their turf is a “Muslim area”, and require that non-Muslims observe the appropriate dress code and the Islamic proscription on alcohol while they are there. The included an embedded video taken by the group and posted on their YouTube account. Since then YouTube has yanked the video, on that it was “intended to harass, bully and threaten.” However, for the sake of the historical record of these dire times, has preserved a (slightly augmented) copy at MRC TV. As you all know by now, our blog was suddenly removed last night between 8 and 9pm EST for no apparent reason.

Blogger never provided any explanation before, during, or after the outage. I assume it was an internal technical problem at Google. Below is a portion of a mass email I sent out earlier today to dozens of people who had written to us to ask what happened: Blogger “removed” our blog suddenly last night. One second it was there; the next it was gone. If we had violated their terms of service, we should have received an email, according to their own established procedure.

But we received no email. I retain my “dashboard” account, as does Dymphna.

And, as you can see, I still have the gmail account. There is no “deleted blogs” link on our dashboards, as there should be if the blog had been deleted deliberately through a normal procedure. Late last night I began the process that one always goes through with Blogger: we posted requests on the help forum. That’s really all that can be done; you can’t talk to human beings where Google is concerned. We actually received a response, which is unusual with Google. Based on the replies, there seems to have been a major problem with Blogger last night.

Many other blogs disappeared in the same fashion. I anticipate that this is most likely a technical glitch on Google’s part, based on the number and types of blogs that had the same thing happen to them last night. But we should know for certain within another day or two. It’s also possible (but far less likely, in my estimation) that we were taken down for political reasons.

If it was a deliberate take-down, we will migrate to another platform with our own domain. We back up the entire blog frequently, so only a few posts will be missing when we restore.